Rethinking Buy-Side Antitrust "Group Boycotts": Key Takeaways for Companies Navigating Collective Buyer Activity


2 minute read | April.01.2026

In a new article published in CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Orrick antitrust partner Craig Falls and associate Brendan McGuire examine the growing wave of antitrust "group boycott" claims targeting collective buyer activity— from lawsuits alleging advertiser boycotts of social media platforms to state-level "anti-boycott" legislation and antitrust investigations aimed at ESG coalitions.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The Group Boycott Doctrine Is Notoriously Murky—and Getting Murkier. The per se rule against group boycotts is already the most confused area of antitrust doctrine, and expanding it to cover socially motivated buyer activity is making things worse. 
  • Buy-Side Boycotts Are Fundamentally Different from Sell-Side Boycotts. Unlike sell-side boycotts, buyers have no inherent reason to condition purchases on what competitors do, and labeling routine supplier reviews or ratings or collective requests for suppliers to improve products as "group boycotts" risks chilling procompetitive conduct.
  • The Proper Analysis Hinges on Whether There Is a Truly "Conditional" Agreement. Buy-side group boycott claims should be limited to "conditional" refusals to deal—where a buyer's refusal is contingent on other buyers also refusing to buy—rather than capturing any collective buyer activity.
  • Incidental Economic Effects Are Not the Same as Harm to Competition. Higher costs or reduced output from buyer demands for product improvements (e.g., sustainability requirements) are not "harm to competition"—the focus should be on whether boycott organizers are shielding themselves from competition, not on incidental economic effects.
  • Social Welfare Justifications Are Cognizable Under the Rule of Reason. As the Third Circuit held in United States v. Brown University, social welfare justifications are cognizable under the antitrust rule of reason and cannot be dismissed categorically—especially where defendants lack an economic self-interest in suppressing competition.

To keep the group boycott doctrine focused on conduct that actually excludes competitors from markets, Falls and McGuire urge that it be limited to boycotts designed to shield some entity from competition—not collective activity in which multiple buyers merely “agree” on what they all want from their suppliers.