9 minute read | August.12.2026
The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWE) has released for consultation a draft bill of the German Offshore Wind Act (“WindSeeG-E”) to “optimise and secure” the expansion of offshore wind. The 70 GW (installed capacity) by 2045 target is maintained, but the policy centre of gravity shifts from speed of build-out to cost efficiency, bankability and supply-chain resilience. For investors and lenders, four changes matter most: (i) a flexible auction corridor, (ii) a two-stage auction with the possibility of obtaining a two-sided contract for difference (“CfD”) as fallback, (iii) a longer permitted operating life for new installations, coupled with a shorter subsequent extension and (iv) a new set of non-price qualification requirements implementing the EU Net-Zero Industry Act ("NZIA").
From 2027, the annual auction volume becomes a corridor of, in principle, 2,000 to 4,800 MW, replacing the currently fixed 4,000 MW target per year. Per tendered site, the volume should generally be 500 to 2,400 MW. The draft also confirms that no offshore wind auction will take place in 2026, following the converter platform delays that hit sites N-10.1 and N-10.2 and the Government’s decision to suspend that round.
The corridor gives the competent authority (Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency) discretion with respect to the site development plan (Fächenentwicklungsplan, “FEP”) to align generation volumes with grid build-out, site availability and system costs. Roughly 3,000 MW per year must come online from 2035 to hit the target of 70 GW installed offshore wind capacity by 2045, and cross-border cooperation projects (pursuant to sec. 5 Renewable Energies Act (“EEG”)) can be counted towards both the target and the auction volumes.
The WindSeeG-E introduces a two-stage award procedure, largely harmonised across centrally pre-investigated and non-pre-investigated sites. Stage one tests whether any bidder will build without support; where several are willing, a dynamic ascending auction determines a payment component (§ 21 WindSeeG-E), 90% of which flows to the connecting TSO as an electricity cost reduction component and 5% each to marine conservation and fisheries (§ 22 WindSeeG-E). CfD support becomes available only where no bidder accepts the opening bid round price, i.e. where nobody is willing to go merchant. Stage two is then a descending dynamic auction for the lowest “applicable value” (anzulegender Wert, i.e. the strike price of the German support mechanism) under a two-sided CfD, delivered through the EEG market premium and the refinancing contribution (on this topic, see our Client Briefing on the German CfD scheme under the EEG 2027).
This is a compromise between the previous Government’s merchant model and the current Coalition’s CfD ambitions, and it adds a layer of complexity and outcome uncertainty that bidders must take into account. Three features deserve close attention.
For the CfD stage, the maximum bid value (strike price) is 9.487 ct/kWh for non-centrally pre-investigated sites and 9.6715 ct/kWh for centrally pre-investigated sites, the latter reflecting a 15% uplift on assumed support costs to accommodate the NZIA-criteria. The underlying reference case assumes 3,600 full load hours per year, capex of EUR 2.8 billion per GW, opex of 2% of capex and a WACC of 5.3%. Alongside its existing 10% deviation power, BNetzA may now adjust the maximum value for individual sites where the yield forecast in the FEP departs materially from those assumptions, by up to 35% for non-centrally pre-investigated sites and 20% for centrally pre-investigated sites.
The substantially higher bid caps acknowledge the cost increases seen across European offshore markets, and site-specific differentiation is a sensible way to reflect genuine differences in yield and economics. The open question is how BNetzA uses its flexibility to balance consumer cost against the risk of another failed auction. The practical consequence for bidders is that the yield studies underpinning the FEP become commercially decisive, so they should scrutinise those studies and BNetzA’s adjustment methodology well ahead of each bid date.
Installed offshore wind farm capacity may in future exceed the allocated grid connection capacity. BSH gains a new power to determine the connection capacity allocated to each FEP site, within a corridor permitting site-specific overplanting of up to 20%; no particular degree is prescribed and current modelling points to materially lower levels in the standard case. In parallel, the so-called 2K criterion (a key environmental protection limit on the permissible warming of the seabed caused by submarine and landing cables laid underground or within the seabed) is dropped, since carrying more power heats the cables further and the limit has therefore capped the transmission capacity of the 2 GW connection systems. Reduced power density and partial resizing of sites should also cut wake effects and lift full load hours.
Overplanting improves full load hours and utilisation of the grid connection point and reduces relative network costs, but it also raises the levelised cost of offshore wind at project level. The 20% figure is a ceiling rather than a target, and the draft’s own explanatory material acknowledges that current modelling points to materially lower levels in the standard case. Because the degree of overplanting is set site by site in the FEP rather than in the statute, bidders need clarity on the assumed overplanting before bid submission, and curtailment and compensation risk should be modelled explicitly.
Permits for new offshore wind farms and other energy generation installations, expressly including electrolysers, are to be granted for 35 years rather than 25 years, unless planning considerations require otherwise and the FEP specifies a shorter period before the auction; the one-off subsequent extension is reduced from ten to five years. Existing awarded projects do not benefit from a blanket uplift (transitional rule in § 102(8) WindSeeG-E), but retain the existing option of a one-off extension of up to ten years.
The WindSeeG-E implements Article 26 of the NZIA and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1176 through two new qualification hurdles.
An incorrect or incomplete cyber security self-declaration counts as a serious case of unreliability and triggers a mandatory prohibition on further construction or operation.
As under the EEG, resilience criteria are now embedded in auction design, and implementation detail will decide how workable they are. The immediate contractual consequence is upstream: supply and procurement agreements will need origin warranties, certification undertakings, audit and evidence rights, and back-to-back indemnities, because compliance is verified after award (from 2032) and failure will be sanctioned at operator level.
Securities and penalties: realisation security rises to EUR 200/kW for non-centrally pre-investigated sites and EUR 250/kW for centrally pre-investigated sites, plus a dynamic element of 5% of the successful payment bid where the award is made at stage one. 25% is due at the bid date and the balance within three months of award, and separate security must be posted for the payment obligation. Unilateral surrender of awards remains unavailable.
Hydrogen at scale: while the enables the testing of combined generation and electrolysis concepts and imports the overriding public interest in hydrogen infrastructure, it stops short of a clear route to scalable mixed power-and-hydrogen grid connections.
Bid strategy needs to be built for both stages at once, including the decision whether to bid merchant with a payment component or to accept CfD support, and the effect of the NZIA multipliers on the effective award value; the interaction between the NZIA criteria and the bid cap deserves particular attention. Financing and PPA structures should be tested against an unindexed CfD, the single ten-year switch option under the EEG 2027 and the revenue clawback through the refinancing contribution. Supply chain contracts should be reviewed now for origin, certification, cyber security and CO2 footprint commitments capable of surviving post-award verification.
Finally, the stakeholder consultation closes on 17 August 2026, followed by Cabinet adoption, parliamentary deliberations and EU state aid clearance. That is a tight sequence if the 2027 auctions are to proceed on time, which in practice means the consultation window is the main opportunity to shape the outcome.