By A.
Cory Lankford, Susannah
Landes Weaver and Adam Wenner
The Energy Policy Act of 2005
("EPAct 2005") established a national policy to encourage reliable
and affordable demand response services. Demand response refers to the ability of retail electric customers
to reduce or shift their load when demand for electricity is highest
in order to lower electricity prices and avert blackouts or energy
shortages. Typical demand response participants include large
industrial and commercial customers (for example, a factory might
shift its production to the evening when electricity demand is
lower, or a large retail chain might agree to set its cooling system
one degree higher to reduce its load on an August afternoon), but
several markets have created opportunities for aggregated small
retail customers as well.
Demand response providers have long participated in the wholesale
market, bidding in demand response resources to offset the need for
additional energy generation, but the compensation for such
providers has varied from one regional energy market to the
next. To encourage greater demand response participation in
wholesale markets, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
issued Order No. 745 in 2011, amending its regulations to
require compensation for demand response resources
participating in FERC-regulated wholesale power markets at the
locational marginal price ("LMP"). LMP is the benchmark of
compensation used for wholesale generation resources. In other
words, a demand response participant would get paid the same amount
not to use electricity at peak times that an electric generator
would get paid for providing electricity to the wholesale energy
market at that time.
The Electric Power Supply Association ("EPSA"), a trade group
representing wholesale electricity generators, as well as several other
parties, challenged Order No. 745 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia ("D.C. Circuit"). In March 2014, the
D.C. Circuit struck down Order No.
745, holding that FERC lacked jurisdiction under the Federal Power
Act to regulate demand response. That court reasoned that
because demand response providers are retail market
participants, the Federal Power Act bars the federal government from
regulating them, and instead reserves such regulation to the
States. The D.C. Circuit also concluded that the decision to
set compensation at the LMP was arbitrary and capricious.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and sought to resolve
two issues: (1) does FERC have authority under the Federal Power Act
to regulate payment for demand response in wholesale electricity
markets (the jurisdictional question), and (2) did the Court of
Appeals err in determining that it was arbitrary and capricious for
FERC to require wholesale energy markets to provide direct
compensation to demand response resources at the LMP (the merits
question)?
On October 14, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court heard arguments in
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply Association, et al. Eight Justices heard the case (Justice Alito recused
himself), and there seems to be a real chance of a four-four
split. From the questioning at the oral argument, it appeared
that Justices Scalia and Roberts sided with EPSA and that Justices
Breyer and Sotomayor sided with FERC. While they were much
quieter at the oral argument, based on their voting records, it is a
fair guess that Justice Thomas will join his conservative-leaning
colleagues and side with EPSA and that Justices Ginsburg and Kagan
will side with FERC. The conservative Justices will probably
see this as a federalism case and resolve it based solely on the
jurisdictional provision of the Federal Power Act, reserving
regulation of the "sale of electric energy" in the retail market to
the States. The liberal-leaning Justices, by contrast, are far
less likely to see this case as one about federalism and will likely
apply Chevron deference to FERC on both the jurisdictional
and the merits questions.[1]
As is not uncommon, Justice Kennedy may be the swing vote.
The nature of his questions suggested that Justice Kennedy was
leaning toward EPSA's side, but he appeared to be genuinely
searching for responses and not pre-set in his views. Justice
Kennedy's questions indicated that he viewed the case as presenting
an issue of federalism, and that he thinks it is important to
understand where the line between federal and state power
lies. He also appeared to think that FERC's motives for
adopting the rule changes set forth in Order No. 745 (namely, to
bring down wholesale energy prices and avert blackouts) did not
matter if the effect of the rule was to drive electricity rates in
the retail market. In addition, Justice Kennedy expressed
concern that FERC had not adequately explained the rule. He
seemed particularly concerned that FERC was relying on a circular
argument: that market forces will work everything out when
FERC itself was creating the market (he made this point
twice). Justice Kennedy was the only Justice who took interest
in this second question (the merits question), suggesting that he
was not decided on the first issue (the jurisdictional question).
If the case results in a four-four split, the D.C. Circuit's
opinion will be upheld without an opinion. Some commentators
have suggested that if that were the outcome, we would already know
because if the Justices split four-four at conference, they would
quickly issue a one-sentence order upholding the D.C. Circuit.
But this is an important case, and even if the initial vote at
conference were an even split there may well be jockeying for a
fifth vote on both sides. The Supreme Court is unlikely to
release an order disposing of the case while any Justice is still
working to convince others. For example, it is possible that
Justice Kennedy will cobble together a compromise with the liberal
Justices to say that FERC has jurisdiction to regulate demand
response in the wholesale markets, but that FERC did not adequately
explain its decision to adopt LMP as the benchmark for
compensation. Such a result likely would be more appealing to
the liberal Justices than a split upholding the D.C. Circuit's
decisions. It also might quell Justice Kennedy's concerns
about how FERC developed and supported its demand response
rule. But the most likely outcome remains a four-four split
upholding the D.C. Circuit's decision without an opinion.
A copy of Order No. 745 can be found here.
For more information about these matters, please contact:
A.
Cory Lankford Managing Associate [email protected] (202)
339-8620
Susannah
Landes Weaver Managing Associate [email protected] (202)
339-8536
Adam Wenner Partner [email protected] (202)
339-8515
[1] See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(stating that where a statute does not directly address an issue,
the courts should defer to an agency's interpretation of such
statute unless it is unreasonable). In City of Arlington, Texas. v. Federal Communications Commission, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013), the Court concluded
that courts should apply Chevron deference to an agency's
determination of its own jurisdiction. |