Orrick Derivatives Month in Review
The Derivatives Month in Review
highlights the month's important legal, regulatory and other
newsworthy developments in the area of
derivatives.

Lehman Bankruptcy Court Addresses
Withholding Scheduled Swap Payments to a Bankrupt
Counterparty
On September 15, 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York (the "Court") determined
that Metavante Corporation ("Metavante"), a counterparty to an
interest rate swap agreement with Lehman Brothers Special
Financing ("LBSF"), a bankrupt Lehman entity, was no longer
excused from performing under the swap (to the extent it had
been at all) and no longer had the ability to terminate the
swap.
Metavante had entered into the swap with LBSF in November
2007. Under the terms of the swap, Metavante was to pay
periodic amounts on an amortizing notional amount based on a
fixed rate and was to receive periodic amounts on the same
amortizing notional amount based on a floating rate (i.e.,
three-month LIBOR).
LBSF filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") on October 3,
2008. After that date, in reliance on Section 2(a)(iii)
of the ISDA Master Agreement governing the swap, Metavante
elected not to make any of the net scheduled payments to LBSF
that the swap periodically required. Section 2(a)(iii)
is standard to swap agreements and provides, generally, that a
party's obligation to make a scheduled payment is conditioned
on there being no default with respect to its counterparty
existing at the time such payment is to be made.
Metavante also elected not to terminate the swap based on the
bankruptcy, which constituted a default under the swap
documentation.[1] If Metavante had elected to
terminate the swap under the market conditions existing at the
time of the LBSF bankruptcy filing or at any time thereafter,
Metavante apparently would have owed a substantial payment to
LBSF in connection with the early termination.[2]
LBSF essentially requested that the Court (i) compel
Metavante to continue to perform under the swap, subject to
LBSF's right as a debtor to choose to assume or reject the
contract[3] and
(ii) deny Metavante the ability to early terminate the
swap. In making its petition, LBSF argued that
Metavante's failure to make the scheduled payments required by
the swap violated the Code because such a suspension
impermissibly modified the swap, an executory contract, solely
as a result of LBSF's bankruptcy filing.[4] LBSF further argued
that Metavante's nearly one-year delay in terminating the swap
should result in Metavante's waiver of its right to do so.
The Court granted LBSF the requested relief. In
particular, the Court referred to an earlier Enron case to
support the position that a swap counterparty's right to early
terminate, accelerate, liquidate and net its protected
contracts despite its counterparty's bankruptcy (known as the
"safe harbor" provisions) must be exercised "fairly
contemporaneously" with the debtor's bankruptcy filing.
The ISDA Master Agreement itself does not provide a time
limit for reliance on Section 2(a)(iii) rights.[5] Similarly, the Code
does not provide a timeframe during which a counterparty must
exercise its early termination rights in connection with its
protected contracts with a debtor. The Court's decision
does not resolve these points absolutely, although it does
provide some guidance to market participants. In short,
the Court made clear that a party is not indefinitely
permitted—if at all—to withhold payments while not moving
forward with some urgency to close out its existing protected
contracts in reliance on the safe harbor provisions of the
Code.[6]
Indeed, the Court found that waiting for almost a year before
doing so (or in Metavante's case, without attempting to do so
at all) is certainly too long.

SEC Extends Temporary Exemptions Granted
to Facilitate Central Clearing and Settlement of CDS
On September 14, 2009, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") issued a release (the "Extension Release")
which extended the expiration dates of five interim final
temporary rules (the "Interim Rules") it had adopted in
January 2009 under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the
"Securities Act"), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended (the "Exchange Act"), and the Trust Indenture Act of
1939, as amended, relating to credit default swaps
("CDS"). The Interim Rules were adopted in connection
with temporary exemptive orders issued by the SEC to foster
the development and facilitate the operation of central
clearing counterparties ("CCPs") for eligible types of
CDS. Among other things, the Interim Rules temporarily
(i) exempt from all provisions of the Securities Act (except
the anti-fraud provisions) eligible CDS transactions that are
offered and sold only to "eligible contract participants" (as
defined in Section 1a(12) of the Commodities Exchange Act of
2000, as amended) and that are cleared by either a CCP
satisfying specified conditions for exemption set forth in its
exemptive order or a clearing agency registered under Section
17A of the Exchange Act; (ii) exempt any exchange that effects
transactions in eligible CDS from the requirements of
Sections 5 and 6 of the Exchange Act to register as a
"national securities exchange" and (iii) exempt any broker or
dealer that effects transactions on an exchange in eligible
CDS from the requirements of Section 5 of the Exchange
Act.
In the Extension Release, the SEC noted that, since the
adoption of its Interim Rules, it had granted temporary
exemptive orders to five CCPs to clear CDS. Of those
five, only one CCP had become actively engaged as a CCP
clearing CDS transactions in the United States; the other CCPs
had either suspended their efforts, had begun clearing CDS in
Europe or continued to work with participants to become
operational. The SEC explained that the purpose of
extending the Interim Rules was to allow the CCP that has
begun operations to continue to clear and settle CDS
transactions[7]
and to enable other CCPs to begin operating in a manner
contemplated by the exemptive orders, hence increasing
competition among CCPs and reducing clearing fees. The
SEC also noted that the operation of CCPs, as facilitated by
the existence of the Interim Rules, would enable it
to provide oversight to the relevant CDS market through, among
other things, the on-site inspection of facilities, records
and personnel.
The Extension Release extended the expiration date of the
Interim Rules from September 25, 2009 to November 30, 2010,
during which period the SEC will continue monitoring the
development and operation of CCPs in the CDS market,
particularly in light of the evolving regulatory and
legislative environment.

ECB Releases Report Regarding OTC
Derivatives Post-Trading Infrastructure
In September 2009, the European Central Bank ("ECB")
released a report entitled OTC Derivatives and Post-Trading
Infrastructures (the "Report"). In 2008, the ECB
launched an analysis of the over-the-counter ("OTC")
derivatives market and its infrastructure for the primary
products entered into in the marketplace (i.e., interest rate
swaps, equity derivatives, credit default swaps, foreign
exchange derivatives and, although they are not typically
categorized as derivatives, repurchase agreements). This
analysis, which focused on the euro-segment of the market, was
initiated as a result of concerns over the limited development
of post-trading infrastructure for these products,
particularly against the backdrop of the recent financial
turmoil, and its possible effect on the euro area. The
Report presents the main findings of this analysis, including
a summary of the general market characteristics and the
current state of post-trading infrastructure, and discusses
the policy implications relating to its findings.
The Report first describes each of the product types and
its characteristics. Relying largely on data from the
Bank for International Settlements, it also identifies banks
and other financial institutions as the main market
participants in OTC derivatives by product. The Report
places great weight on what it views as the systemic relevance
of the OTC derivatives markets "in particular because of the
existence of large exposures between a limited number of
financial institutions."[8] Among other things, the Report
points out that the web of interdependencies related to OTC
derivatives between the market-making dealers means that
disruptions at one such dealer may easily be transmitted to
others, as well as to the wider financial system.
The Report then discusses the three phases of
the post-trade processing of OTC derivatives: (i)
pre-clearing, (ii) clearing and (iii) settlement. The
pre-clearing phase mainly involves trade confirmation and
matching services. The Report notes that, according to
recent data, approximately 50% of OTC derivatives
continue to be confirmed on paper. The profound spike in
volume of these trades has resulted in delays in confirming
transactions which, in turn, has weakened the enforceability
of trades, hampered the ability of trade counterparties to net
their exposures and increased the risk of incorrect
book-keeping (which could lead to an incorrect measure of
counterparty credit risk). The Report further notes that
OTC derivatives are still predominantly cleared through
bilateral arrangements, as opposed to centrally.
Finally, the Report discusses the predominant existing methods
of periodic settlement for OTC derivatives.
The Report notes that there have been numerous recent
industry efforts in the area of electronic trade processing
and matching services. It also acknowledges that the
urgent push by regulators and market participants to establish
central clearing counterparties, particularly for the credit
default swap market, has led to progress in the development of
such entities. However, it concludes that the market
coverage of existing post-trading infrastructure for OTC
derivatives is by no means comprehensive.
In sum, the Report findings highlight the systemic
relevance of the OTC derivatives market owing to its size and
to the central role of major financial institutions in its
trading activities. The findings also underscore
the importance of the euro currency in these transactions and
the significant share of market participants located in the
euro area. The Report concludes that its findings point
to two main policy implications: (i) the importance of
developing post-trading infrastructure to support the safe,
efficient and transparent functioning of the OTC derivatives
markets and (ii) the need to accompany the development of
post-trading infrastructure for OTC derivatives with close
cross-border cooperation among the relevant competent
authorities.

ISDA Announces Results of Mid-Year 2009
Market Survey
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.
("ISDA") announced the results of its Mid-Year 2009
Market Survey (the "Survey") of privately-negotiated
derivatives at its regional conference in New York City on
September 15, 2009. The Survey results indicated that
the notional amounts outstanding over the past six months of
interest rate derivatives increased by 3% to $414.1 trillion,
of equity derivatives remained flat at $8.8 trillion and of
credit derivatives decreased by 19% to $31.2 trillion.
Each of these products has seen a decline in notional amounts
outstanding over the past year by 11%, 26% and 43%,
respectively.
The Survey cautioned that the notional amounts outstanding
reflected only approximate market activity, not risk. It
also pointed out that, as of December 2008, according to the
Bank for International Settlements, the gross market value
(i.e., the cost of replacement) of all derivatives was
approximately 5.7% of outstanding notional amount and the net
credit exposure (i.e., after netting of exposures but before
the application of any collateral) of all derivatives was
approximately 0.80 percent of outstanding notional
amount. Applying these percentages to the total notional
amount outstanding of $454.1 trillion for the trade types
covered by the Survey results in a gross mark-to-market value
of $26 trillion and a net credit exposure of $3.8
trillion. The Survey results were based on responses
from ISDA's "primary membership": 86 firms provided responses
on interest rate derivatives, 77 firms provided responses on
equity derivatives and 78 firms provided responses on credit
derivatives.

Footnotes
[1] Note that Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., LBSF's credit support provider, had filed for
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Code on
September 15, 2008, which itself gave rise to a default under
the relevant swap documentation. Metavante appears not
to have argued that it withheld performance based on the
existence of this default, as opposed to that of its actual
counterparty, LBSF.
[2] Although not necessarily
equivalent to the early termination amount that would have
been calculated in connection with a termination under the
relevant swap documentation, as a point of reference,
Metavante recorded in its annual and quarterly filings
liabilities in connection with the swap of $13.833 million as
of June 30, 2009 and $6.577 million as of December 31,
2008.
[3] See generally 11
U.S.C. § 365.
[4] See 11 U.S. C. §
365(e)(1).
[5] Note, however, that certain
market participants (primarily end-users) made efforts to
include such a period (e.g., 30-90 days) in connection with
the drafting of the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement.
[6] In Enron Australia vs.
TXU Electricity Ltd. (2003 NSWSC 1169), a 2003 Australian
case involving an electricity swap, the Australian court
permitted TXU to withhold performance in reliance on Section
2(a)(iii) while not moving to effect an early termination of
the swap. Obviously, this case did not constitute a
precedent for the Court under U.S. bankruptcy law and,
apparently, was not persuasive to the Court.
[7] The SEC pointed out that it
believed that the operation of this CCP, ICE U.S. Trust LLC
("ICE Trust"), alone had contributed to increased transparency
and the reduction of systemic risk in the CDS market.
According to its filing for the quarter ending on June
30, 2009, ICE Trust reported that it had processed more than
22,800 CDS transactions, hence reducing the net exposure on
these trades from over $1.3 trillion to $168.5 billion by
clearing the trades and netting positions.
[8] Report, at 12.
If you have any questions about or wish to discuss further
any of the contents of this issue of Derivatives Month in
Review, please contact Nikiforos
Mathews at +1 (212) 506
5257. |